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The Unbearable Rightness of Auer 
Cass R. Sunstein† & Adrian Vermeule†† 
For more than seventy years, courts have deferred to reasonable agency inter-
pretations of ambiguous regulations. The Auer principle, as it is now called, has 
attracted academic criticism and some skepticism within the Supreme Court. But 
the principle is entirely correct. In the absence of a clear congressional direction, 
courts should assume that because of their specialized competence, and their greater 
accountability, agencies are in the best position to decide on the meaning of am-
biguous terms. The recent challenges to the Auer principle rest on fragile founda-
tions, including an anachronistic understanding of the nature of interpretation, an 
overheated argument about the separation of powers, and an empirically unfounded 
and logically weak argument about agency incentives, which exemplifies what we 
call “the sign fallacy.” 
INTRODUCTION 
Agencies issue countless regulations and, using the standard 
interpretive tools,1 courts sometimes find them ambiguous. What 
is the appropriate methodology for resolving such ambiguities? 
There are two basic answers. The first, offered by long-
standing law,2 is that the agency’s own interpretation generally 
prevails, with certain case-specific exceptions that we will dis-
cuss.3 The second,4 currently supported by a minority coalition 
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 †† Ralph S. Tyler Jr Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. We are 
grateful to Ron Levin, John Manning, Arden Rowell, David Strauss, participants at a 
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posium for valuable comments, and to Evelyn Blacklock and Maile Yeats-Rowe for su-
perb research assistance. Parts of this Essay significantly expand and revise, while 
drawing on, a section of a near-contemporaneous, and much longer, article, Cass R.  
Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative 
Law, 2015 S Ct Rev 41. We are grateful for permission to draw on that section here. 
 1 Because of our focus on Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997), we are bracketing 
here the question exactly what these are, but people are in broad agreement on them. 
There are disputes, of course, about (for example) the role of text, purpose, and avoidance 
of absurdity. 
 2 See id at 461; Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co, 325 US 410, 413–14 (1945). 
 3 See Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1208 n 4 (2015) (listing 
qualifications to Auer deference). 
 4 For the seminal article, with a host of original and ingenious arguments that ap-
pear to have inspired the attack on Auer, see generally John F. Manning, Constitutional 
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on the Supreme Court (or perhaps only by Justice Clarence 
Thomas), is that judges must resolve the ambiguity without def-
erence to the agency’s view.5 
Sometimes long-standing law is right, and the best answer, 
by far, is the first. It reduces both the costs of decision and the 
costs of errors. It greatly simplifies the task of interpreting regu-
lation; it also reflects a sensible understanding of institutional 
competence (as the second palpably does not). The resolution of 
ambiguities often involves complex issues of fact and value. 
Agencies, and not judges, should be settling those issues. 
The argument in favor of independent judicial judgment re-
flects an emerging, large-scale distrust of the administrative 
state, even—in some quarters—a belief that it is constitutionally 
illegitimate.6 In our view, that belief is utterly baseless.7 But 
even if it is not, the appropriate response is hardly to say that 
judges, with their own institutional weaknesses and potential 
biases,8 should make the judgments that are entailed by resolv-
ing ambiguities in regulations. If taken seriously, general argu-
ments from the separation of powers and general arguments 
about the constitutional illegitimacy of the administrative state 
would sweep far more broadly than the relatively modest prob-
lem of deference to agency interpretation of agency regulations. 
If taken seriously, those arguments would have radical implica-
tions for delegation, the combination of functions in agencies, and 
other fundamental features of the modern administrative state. 
There is a grave mismatch between the heavy constitutional  
artillery and the idea that when some word in a regulation  
 
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L 
Rev 612 (1996). 
 5 See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1213–25 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). There are 
actually two different versions of the alternative to Auer deference: either no deference, 
or so-called deference after Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 139–40 (1944). Justice 
Antonin Scalia seemingly preferred the former, see note 34 and accompanying text, 
while Professor John Manning argues for the latter, see Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 
618, 686–90 (cited in note 4). We discuss the Skidmore alternative at notes 86–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 6 See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 12 (Chicago 2014). See 
also Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Ad-
ministrative Law, 2015 S Ct Rev 41, 42–43. 
 7 For a legal defense, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From 
Law’s Empire to the Administrative State (Harvard 2016). For a historical defense, see 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred 
Years of American Administrative Law 312 (Yale 2012). 
 8 See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823, 825–26 (2006). 
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admits of more than one interpretation, courts should be able to 
make the choice. 
Our basic goal here is to defend the first answer, known in 
the world of administrative law as the Auer principle, after a 
unanimous decision for the Court written by the late Justice  
Antonin Scalia in Auer v Robbins.9 In the process, we identify 
three reasons why a strand of the contemporary legal culture 
finds that principle jarring, in a sense even unbearable. The first 
involves anachronistic but influential understandings of what 
interpretation actually entails. Even in the aftermath of legal 
realism, some people believe that the interpretation of ambigui-
ties calls for purely legal skills—as it plainly does not. Here we 
follow Scalia, Auer’s author, who insisted—at least until very 
late in his career—that interpretation necessarily includes con-
sideration of policy consequences, and of the institutional roles 
that best serve to allocate responsibility for policy consequences. 
The second reason involves the heavy constitutional artil-
lery, applied in a context in which it does not belong and without 
regard to its far larger implications. In some ways, the issue of 
Auer deference appears to be a stalking horse for much larger 
game—namely, a wholesale critique of the administrative state. 
The constitutional critique of Auer rests on generalities about 
the separation of lawmaking from law execution and law inter-
pretation. If applied consistently, those generalities would re-
quire declaring unconstitutional dozens of major federal agen-
cies. The theory of the administrative state, for better or for 
worse, is that so long as separation of powers operates at the top 
level (Congress, presidency, judiciary), there is no general prob-
lem if the top-level institutions decide to create lower-level 
agencies that exercise combined functions. And in any event, it 
is quite clear that those agencies do not mingle or combine con-
stitutional powers at all. So long as they act within and under a 
legislative grant of statutory authority, everything they do 
amounts to an exercise of “executive” power, including both the 
making and interpreting of rules, as Scalia emphasized for the 
Court as recently as 2013.10 
The third reason involves an intuitively appealing, but wildly 
unrealistic, understanding of the incentive effects of Auer.  
Invocation of those incentive effects is a reflection of a pervasive 
 
 9 519 US 452 (1997). 
 10 See text accompanying notes 53–55. 
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error within the economic analysis of law, which is to identify 
the likely sign of an effect and then to declare victory, without 
examining its magnitude—without asking whether it is realistic 
to think that the effect will be significant. This error deserves its 
own name; we call it “the sign fallacy.” 
As a matter of methodology, the three reasons share a simi-
lar defect. They invoke large abstractions—about the identifica-
tion of meaning, about separation of powers, about agency in-
centives—to resolve a concrete puzzle for which such 
abstractions are either misplaced or unhelpful. The same defect 
can be found in many disputes about how judges should proceed; 
the Auer controversy is only one example. 
I.  CASES AND PROBLEMS 
To see the wide range of cases to which Auer is relevant,11 
consider the following:12 
1.  The facts of Auer itself: An agency must decide whether 
police captains and sergeants are eligible for overtime under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The statute contains an ex-
emption from overtime for “executive, administrative, or 
professional” employees.13 Binding regulations, enacted with 
notice and comment, say that such employees must be paid 
on a “salary basis,” the antonym of piecework. The regula-
tions further say that if pay is “subject to” being adjusted for 
quality, it is an indicator of piecework. The problem then 
becomes this: police captains might have their pay docked if, 
after internal affairs proceedings, they are found to have 
committed disciplinary infractions, such as maltreating a 
 
 11 Here and throughout, we assume that the agency’s interpretation of its own leg-
islative regulation either was enacted through notice-and-comment procedures in its own 
right, or else falls within a valid exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking under 
§ 553(b)(3)(A) or (B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (the exceptions for interpretive 
rules, procedural rules, general statements of policy, or legislative rules as to which 
there is “good cause” for dispensing with notice and comment). 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A)–(B). 
We thereby bracket and set aside any claim that the agency’s interpretation was proce-
durally defective; our focus is strictly on the substantive validity of the interpretation. 
Although Chevron deference to agency interpretation of statutes is partly tied to the pro-
cedures agencies use to enact their interpretations, see United States v Mead Corp, 533 
US 218, 229–30 (2001), in the Auer setting the law rejects that approach. Indeed, agen-
cies may receive deference even for interpretations set forth in appellate briefs. See, for 
example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 59 (2011). 
 12 In these hypotheticals, we draw on actual cases but deviate from them in minor 
ways. 
 13 29 USC § 213(a)(1). 
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suspect.14 Does that possibility make them “subject to” ad-
justment for quality of work? What if the captains were 
never actually fined, but could be? How should the agency 
interpret the “subject to” language in the regulation? 
2.  An agency issues a legislative rule requiring employers 
to report occupational diseases within two weeks after they 
are “diagnosed.” An employer asks the agency to clarify 
what counts as a “diagnosis.” The agency answers, in an in-
terpretive rule, that chest x-rays that “score” above a speci-
fied level of opacity count as a diagnosis.15 
3.  An agency issues a regulation that imposes federal tar-
iffs on “diaries” and “bound books.” In an interpretive rule, 
it announces that “diaries” include daily journals, but not 
calendars, and that “bound books” refers only to formal 
bookbinding.16 
4.  An agency issues a legislative rule that exempts “waiting 
time” from the requirements of its overtime regulations. In 
an interpretive rule, it says that certain emergency services 
employees are engaged in “waiting time,” rather than 
“working time,” if they are not required to perform job-
related tasks, even if they have to be accessible by phone 
and available to come into work on ten minutes’ notice.17 
5.  An agency issues a rule requiring swimming pools at ho-
tels to be “fully accessible” to people who use wheelchairs 
through “lifts,” which make pools easy to use. In an inter-
pretation, issued in a public document,18 the agency makes 
 
 14 See Auer, 519 US at 455–56. 
 15 See American Mining Congress v Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F2d 
1106, 1107–08 (DC Cir 1993). 
 16 See Mead, 533 US at 221–25. 
 17 See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 135–36, 139 (1944). 
 18 In accordance with existing law, we are understanding Auer to apply not only to 
“interpretative” rules within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC 
§ 553(b)(3)(A), but also to a broad class of agency interpretations, so long as they are au-
thoritative and do not fall within certain exceptions we will discuss later. See Perez v 
Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1208 n 4 (2015) (listing limited qualifica-
tions and exceptions to Auer deference). Six justices (including the chief justice and Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy) joined the opinion in Perez and its important footnote 4, suggest-
ing that a clear supermajority of the Court is, as of now, willing to accept Auer subject to 
qualifications. Perez, 135 S Ct at 1202. Further evidence is supplied by United Student 
Aid Funds, Inc v Bible, 136 S Ct 1607 (2016), a certiorari petition that asked the Court to 
overturn Auer, but that was denied, with Justice Thomas the lone dissenter. See id at 
1608–09 (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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it clear that to qualify, a lift need not be a permanent part 
of the pool. It can be mobile and simply available to those 
who ask.19 
At least since Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co,20 decided 
in 1945, the Supreme Court has said that so long as the legisla-
tive regulation is genuinely ambiguous, courts should defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations.21 But if we emphasize a pre-
sumption in favor of private ordering, we should be able to see 
an immediate objection, which would move the law in significant 
new directions.22 The regulation sets out the law, and it is bind-
ing. But within the constraints of the law, regulated classes are 
authorized to do whatever they like. In the cases above, the 
agency’s interpretation is essentially irrelevant, because the leg-
islative rule has given the regulated classes (some) room to ma-
neuver. No additional constraints can come from the agency’s in-
terpretation, which would effectively amend the legislative rule 
by imposing further restrictions. 
Consider the swimming pool regulation. If the department 
has not banned hotels from using portable lifts, then they are 
entitled to use portable lifts. It is unlawful to add a requirement, 
through interpretation, that the legislative rule lacks. Perhaps 
many cases in which agencies seek to benefit from the Auer prin-
ciple should be resolved against the government, on the theory 
that if agencies have not expressly regulated private conduct 
through a legislative rule, the matter is at an end. But suppose 
that a regulation is genuinely unclear. If so, the question re-
mains: Who interprets it, court or agency? Does the agency’s 
view deserve some weight? 
II.  DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES: WHAT DOES CONGRESS WANT? 
Suppose that Congress expressly grants HHS the power to 
interpret ambiguities in its own regulations—or expressly denies 
it that authority. That direction should be authoritative subject 
 
 19 But see Questions and Answers: Accessibility Requirements for Existing Swim-
ming Pools at Hotels and Other Public Accommodations (DOJ, May 24, 2012), archived 
at http://perma.cc/2ACJ-V2HV (discussing this issue but coming out the other way via 
“Questions and Answers”). 
 20 325 US 410 (1945). 
 21 Id at 413–14. 
 22 This approach is a close cousin to that defended in Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat-
utes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983), which, in our view, similarly rests on a pre-
sumption in favor of private ordering. See id at 552. 
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of course to any constitutional constraints, which we will discuss 
shortly. The resulting question is simple: Has Congress in fact 
exercised that authority, either globally or in particular statutes? 
The justice who was both Auer’s author and (late in his ca-
reer) its leading judicial critic, Justice Scalia, believed so. He 
pointed to § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act23 (APA), 
which states that “the reviewing court shall . . . interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”24 In his view, the 
APA therefore “contemplates that courts, not agencies, will au-
thoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations.”25 
But as Scalia was aware, that conclusion raises a serious prob-
lem, which is that it would require rejection of the well-
established Chevron principle26 itself, on the ground that it  
defies the APA. Scalia tried to rescue that principle as “in con-
formity with the long history of judicial review of executive ac-
tion,”27 even though it is apparently in tension with the APA (at 
least on the view Scalia is endorsing). By contrast, his reasoning 
seems to run, Auer must be rejected on the ground that the APA 
forbids it—and no such long history justifies it. 
But this argument moves far too quickly. Does the text of 
the APA really require independent judicial interpretations of 
law? If so, it would seem to repudiate any “long history,” which 
would therefore be irrelevant. On many approaches to interpre-
tation, a long history, preceding enactment of a contrary text, 
cannot overcome that text, so long as the text is sufficiently 
clear. Perhaps Scalia believed that the APA is not clear (as we 
shall suggest); but he seemed to think that it is. 
In other writings, however, Scalia offered a different justifi-
cation of Chevron, one that (in his view, as expressed in those 
writings) does not violate any statute or threaten the separation 
of powers. The question is what the APA commands, and the 
statement that the court shall “interpret” questions of law is not 
decisive in favor of independent judicial review, if it is also the 
case that under organic statutes, the correct interpretation of law 
 
 23 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
 24 5 USC § 706. 
 25 Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia concur-
ring in the judgment). 
 26 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 
842–45 (1984). 
 27 Perez, 135 S Ct at 1212 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
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depends on the agency’s interpretation of law.28 If an organic 
statute says “source (as defined by the EPA),” then the law is 
what the agency says (so long as the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable, and subject to constitutional constraints). But sup-
pose that Congress has not said anything explicit but has gener-
ally given an agency the authority to issue regulations. Has it 
also given the agency the authority to interpret ambiguities in 
the underlying statute? If so, then the law is, to that extent, what 
the agency says it is—and in faithfully applying the APA, the re-
viewing court had better say so. On this view, courts do not vio-
late the APA by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations; 
such deference just is, itself, part of the law that courts declare.29 
But when exactly should judges conclude that Congress has 
indeed given agencies interpretive authority? Scalia saw that as 
a difficult question, answered in Chevron by a (good) legal fic-
tion, one that is superior to the legal fiction that preceded it. His 
explanation warrants quotation at length: 
An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementa-
tion can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: 
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear 
about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the sub-
ject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency. When 
the former is the case, what we have is genuinely a question 
of law, properly to be resolved by the courts. When the lat-
ter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion 
upon the agency, and the only question of law presented to 
the courts is whether the agency has acted within the scope 
of its discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity 
is reasonable. . . . 
 . . . If the Chevron rule is not a 100% accurate estimation 
of modern congressional intent, the prior case-by-case eval-
uation was not so either—and was becoming less and less 
so, as the sheer volume of modern dockets made it less and 
less possible for the Supreme Court to police diverse appli-
cation of an ineffable rule. And to tell the truth, the quest 
for the “genuine” legislative intent is probably a wild-goose 
chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I expect that 
Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant 
 
 28 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 
1, 6 (1983). 
 29 See id. Here, too, we do not necessarily mean to endorse this justification for 
Chevron, only to elicit its implications for the Auer question. 
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to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn’t 
think about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then 
any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, 
presumed intent, and operates principally as a background 
rule of law against which Congress can legislate. 
 If that is the principal function to be served, Chevron is 
unquestionably better than what preceded it.30 
We think that this argument, relying on “a fictional, presumed 
intent,” is essentially correct, so long as it is understood that the 
choice of fiction depends on the consequences of adopting one or 
another. And the reasons that such an instruction should be 
deemed best are principally consequentialist reasons Chevron 
itself gave, involving the agency’s comparative competence with 
respect to fact-finding and policy-making,31 and its comparative 
political accountability.32 When a statute is unclear, and espe-
cially when a complex modern regulatory statute is unclear, res-
olution of the ambiguity will inevitably require policy-making 
competence—which courts lack and which agencies have.33 In 
1989, Scalia emphasized that precise point as well.34 
III.  AUER’S HOUR 
Which brings us directly to Auer. Nothing in the APA either 
endorses or rejects Auer, at least in express terms. As we have 
 
 30 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
Duke L J 511, 516–17. 
 31 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U Pa L Rev 1607, 
1608–11 (2016). 
 32 See Chevron, 467 US at 865–66. There are other considerations in support of 
Chevron. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of 
the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L 
Rev 1093, 1121 (1987). 
 33 See Sunstein, 164 U Pa L Rev at 1608–09 (cited in note 31). Note, however, the 
interesting qualification in King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480 (2015), stressing that in ex-
traordinary cases, involving issues of great economic and social significance, the pre-
sumption should be reversed, and Congress should be presumed to want independent 
judicial judgment. See id at 2488–89. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 236–42 (2006). 
 34 See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 516–18 (cited in note 30). There is a competing 
view, which would invoke background principles of separation of powers, and perhaps 
concerns about agency self-dealing, to generate a different presumption. See Cynthia R. 
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 
Colum L Rev 452, 456 (1989). See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of 
Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 394–95 (1986) (suggesting a multifactor balancing 
test). In our view, Scalia’s position in 1989 is essentially correct. For discussion, see 
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo Wash L Rev 347, 358 
(2003); Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 202–05 (cited in note 33). 
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noted, courts are instructed to “determine the meaning or ap-
plicability of the terms of an agency action,”35 but perhaps Con-
gress has said, in general or in particular cases, that the mean-
ing of a regulation turns on the agency’s interpretation of its 
meaning, where ambiguity exists. In that case, courts fulfill 
their duty to “determine the meaning” by deferring to that view. 
If so, courts might say that where legislative rules are ambigu-
ous, the law is what the agency says it is (for example, through 
an interpretive rule). 
It is true that just as in Chevron, Congress has not issued 
any such express instruction. But it has not issued a contrary 
instruction either. In this field, any rule again “represents merely 
a fictional, presumed intent”36 that must be defended as the best 
instruction to attribute to the national legislature. As others have 
noted, the best and most straightforward defense of Auer—as a 
rebuttable presumption about implicit legislative instructions as 
to the allocation of interpretive authority—rests on the same ar-
guments that Justice Scalia adduced to justify Chevron.37 
In that light, Auer itself might be defended in two different 
ways.38 The first points to the agency’s comparative epistemic 
advantage as an interpreter. Perhaps the agency has the best 
understanding of what the underlying legislative rule actually 
meant. (Of course this assumes a particular, controversial theory 
of interpretation; but let us bracket that question for the sake of 
discussion.) If an agency uses the word “diagnosis,” it is in the 
best position to know what it had in mind. In some cases, this 
rationale is indeed an exceptionally strong point for Auer, at 
least when the agency has issued an interpretive rule in rela-
tively close temporal proximity to the legislative rule. (It might 
well work in the swimming pools case above, and it would work 
as well for a number of interpretations issued in the aftermath 
of legislative rules under the Affordable Care Act.) But when an 
agency has changed its interpretation, this particular argument 
 
 35 5 USC § 706. 
 36 Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 30). 
 37 See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, Hearing on HR 4768 before the 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 13 (May 17, 2016) (“Testimony of Ronald M. 
Levin”) (statement of Ronald M. Levin, William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of 
Law, Washington University in St. Louis), archived at http://perma.cc/UA66-V28C 
(“[T]he strongest justifications [for Auer] run parallel to the pragmatic justifications for 
Chevron.”). 
 38 For helpful discussion, see Matthew C. Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler, Seminole 
Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo Wash L Rev 1449, 1454–57 (2011). 
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will not work. And in many cases, an agency will not be uncover-
ing an antecedent intention. It will be interpreting a term on 
which it had not previously focused. (That might well be true of 
the diagnosis case above.) 
A second defense of Auer points not to the agency’s epistemic 
advantages as an interpreter, but to its comparative advantages 
as a policy-maker. On this view, interpretation of ambiguous 
regulations is really an exercise in policy-making, at least much 
of the time. A regulatory term like “subject to” calls for further 
specification in a diverse array of cases, an exercise that in turn 
requires judgments of policy. Agencies have technical expertise 
as well as political accountability, and so long as a regulation is 
ambiguous, it should be “interpreted” by them (policy should be 
made by them), not by courts, which lack those advantages. 
To be sure, the “traditional tools of statutory construction”39 
can be used to determine whether there is ambiguity at all. But 
where there is genuine ambiguity, the agency has comparative 
policy-making advantages—precisely parallel to its advantages 
in the Chevron setting. Just as, on Scalia’s view in 1989, Chev-
ron is the best fictional default rule for statutory construction, so 
too Auer is the best fictional default rule for interpretation of 
agency regulations. 
In 2013, Scalia objected that “the purpose of interpretation 
is to determine the fair meaning of the rule,” and “[n]ot to make 
policy.”40 In 1989, by contrast, Scalia had rightly observed “that 
the traditional tools of statutory construction include not merely 
text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the con-
sideration of policy consequences.”41 In his later account, agency 
enactments must be taken “as written,” thus giving “the Execu-
tive [ ] a stable background against which to write its rules and 
achieve the policy ends it thinks best.”42 We have argued that 
even if the 2013 view is correct, Auer is justifiable in a range of 
circumstances. 
In any event, however, for the reasons stated by Scalia in 
1989, the 2013 view is not correct. And on Scalia’s 1989 view, 
Auer is not at all inconsistent with the point, which it does not 
 
 39 Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 843 
n 9 (1984). 
 40 Decker v Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S Ct 1326, 1340 (2013) 
(Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 41 Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 515 (cited in note 30) (quotation marks omitted). 
 42 Decker, 133 S Ct at 1340 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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contest, that regulations must be taken as written. Scalia’s 1989 
discussion shows that Auer is right for the same reason that 
Chevron is right: where Congress has not been clear, deference 
to the agency, in the face of genuine ambiguity, is the best in-
struction to attribute to it. 
IV.  CONCERNS 
Critics of Auer, including Justice Scalia in his later years, 
have several independent concerns. All of them raise significant 
questions about methodology. 
A. Incentives 
On one view, Auer creates an unfortunate and even danger-
ous incentive for agencies, which “is to speak vaguely and broadly, 
so as to retain a ‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with 
retroactive effect.”43 Auer therefore encourages opportunistic be-
havior: agencies will issue vague, broad regulations, knowing 
full well that when the time comes, they will be able to impose 
the interpretation they prefer. 
In the abstract, the concern is certainly intelligible. With 
Auer, agencies can know that they will have the benefit of being 
able to clarify ambiguities; without Auer, they would not have 
that benefit, and might therefore speak precisely. But the idea 
that Auer results in motivated and nefarious obscurity—“a dan-
gerous permission slip for the arrogation of power”44—strikes us 
as a phantasmal terror. Indeed, we are unaware of, and no one 
has pointed to, any regulation in American history that, because 
of Auer, was designed vaguely and broadly.45 There is no reason 
to believe that the magnitude of the posited incentive is sub-
stantial. We are dealing here, at best, with the sign fallacy. 
No one should deny that such a thing might occur. Many 
things might occur. But in deciding on the optimal level of clarity 
and specificity, agencies have a wide range of incentives, cutting 
in different directions, and the most important of these have 
nothing at all to do with Auer. Internal pressures often create an 
 
 43 Decker v Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S Ct 1326, 1341 (2013) 
(Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 44 Id (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 45 In nearly four years in the federal government, one of us (Sunstein) dealt with 
well over two thousand rules, and he never heard even a single person suggest, or come 
close to suggesting, that a regulation should be written vaguely or ambiguously in light 
of Auer, or so that the agency could later interpret it as it saw fit. 
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incentive toward clarity, so that everyone inside government 
knows what the regulation means. External pressures often cut 
in exactly the same direction, with multiple requests for clarity 
from the regulated sector. To be sure, external and internal 
pressures might also call for deliberate ambiguity (though we 
believe that this is far less common). But when ambiguity exists, 
it is rarely, if ever, because of Auer. 
After all, few people who are involved in writing regulations 
think a great deal about Auer; many of them have absolutely no 
idea what Auer is. A recent study finds that Auer was less well-
known to agency drafters of regulations than Chevron U.S.A. Inc 
v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,46 Skidmore v Swift & 
Co,47 and United States v Mead Corp;48 drafters themselves knew 
about Auer only about half of the time.49 It is most unclear that 
even the half that know Auer think seriously about it when they 
are writing regulations. 
There is a further point, which counts as a fundamental ob-
jection to the claim that Auer creates perverse incentives. In an 
important way, Auer actually incentivizes clarity, and eliminat-
ing it would eliminate that incentive. If an agency leaves a regu-
lation ambiguous, it cannot be certain that a subsequent inter-
pretation will be made by an administration with the same or 
similar values. For agencies, ambiguities are a threat at least as 
much as they are an opportunity. One administration might well 
want to ensure that its successor will not be allowed, with the 
aid of Auer, to shift from a prior position. We do not press this 
point, because doing so would commit the sign fallacy (with a 
different sign). Our only suggestion is that those who think Auer 
is wrong, because of the incentive problem, might have the sign 
wrong. There are multiple incentives cutting in multiple direc-
tions, and their net magnitude is at best unclear. 
There is a palpable lack of realism, and a lack of empirical 
grounding, to the widespread concern that Auer is a significant 
part of the constellation of considerations that lead agencies to 
speak specifically or not. We do not believe that agencies often 
preserve ambiguity on purpose—in fact we think that that is high-
ly unusual—but when they do, Auer is hardly ever, and possibly 
 
 46 467 US 837 (1984). 
 47 323 US 134 (1944). 
 48 533 US 218 (2001). 
 49 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan L Rev 
999, 1061–66 (2015). 
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never, part of the picture. The critics speak abstractly of possible 
abuses, but present no empirical evidence to substantiate their 
fears. 
B. Separation of Powers 
Auer’s critics have a more fundamental objection, one that 
involves heavy artillery,50 and that also has intuitive appeal: the 
decision produces a constitutionally suspect combination of the 
power to make law with the power to interpret law. Quoting 
Montesquieu, Scalia insisted that this is a serious problem, be-
cause when “legislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person . . . there can be no liberty.”51 He concluded: “He 
who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”52 At least 
Chevron preserves that separation, because agencies interpret 
what Congress enacts, but Auer obliterates it, because agencies 
interpret what agencies enact. Or so the argument runs. 
But this critique of Auer is both unsound and too sweeping. 
There are four critical points. First, the traditional and main-
stream understanding in American public law is that when 
agencies—acting within a statutory grant of authority—make 
rules, interpret rules, and adjudicate violations, they exercise 
executive power, not legislative or judicial power. Executive power 
itself includes the power to make and interpret rules, in the 
course of carrying out statutory responsibilities.53 Hence there is 
no commingling of functions within agencies in the first place; 
any talk to the contrary is loose and imprecise. The Court re-
cently and emphatically reiterated this point, through the pen of 
. . . Scalia: 
[T]he dissent overstates when it claims that agencies exer-
cise “legislative power” and “judicial power.” . . . The former 
is vested exclusively in Congress, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, the 
latter in the “one supreme Court” and “such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish,” Art. III, § 1. Agencies make rules (“Private cattle may 
be grazed on public lands X, Y, and Z subject to certain con-
ditions”) and conduct adjudications (“This rancher’s grazing 
 
 50 See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 654 (cited in note 4). 
 51 Decker, 133 S Ct at 1341 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ellip-
sis in original). 
 52 Id at 1342 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 53 See United States v Grimaud, 220 US 506, 521 (1911) (noting that statutory au-
thority to make administrative rules is a grant of executive power, not legislative power). 
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permit is revoked for violation of the conditions”) and have 
done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities 
take “legislative” and “judicial” forms, but they are exercises 
of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be 
exercises of—the “executive Power.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.54 
This understanding rests on a long-standing theory of the 
nature and scope of executive power—what has aptly been 
called the “completion” theory, in the context of presidential 
power.55 When agencies make rules and interpret law in the 
course of executing their statutory grants of authority, they are 
carrying out or completing a legislative plan—“carrying [it] into 
Execution,” to adapt the words of the Constitution.56 
Nothing in that activity amounts to an exercise of legislative 
or judicial power, properly speaking. Of course there is a sepa-
rate question here about the validity of the underlying grant of 
authority, which must contain an “intelligible principle” to avoid 
an invalid delegation of legislative authority.57 But the constitu-
tional critique of Auer is different from, and tangential to, the 
delegation issue; the former is meant to apply even when the 
grant of statutory authority is straightforwardly valid under the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
Our second point is that the separation-of-powers critique of 
Auer, and of the combination of rulemaking and rule-
interpreting functions, is pitched at the wrong level. The separa-
tion of powers is fully satisfied so long as the principal institu-
tions set out in the Constitution—Congress, president, and judi-
ciary—exercising their prescribed functions, devise and approve 
the scheme of agency authority that combines rulemaking and 
rule-interpreting power in the agency’s hands. Whatever reasons 
make the constitutional separation of powers attractive in turn 
support that combination of functions. If the constitutional insti-
tutions, operating as they were set up to operate, have decided 
that such an arrangement is both valid and wise, then respect for 
the separation of powers counsels approval of the arrangement. 
 
 54 City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communications Commission, 133 S Ct 1863, 
1873 n 4 (2013). 
 55 See Jack Goldsmith and John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 
115 Yale L J 2280, 2282 (2006). 
 56 US Const Art I, § 8. The idea behind the clause is actually helpful, by analogy. 
Just as Congress makes laws to “carry into execution” its powers granted by higher (con-
stitutional) law, so too agencies make rules to carry into execution their powers granted 
by higher (statutory) law. 
 57 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co v United States, 276 US 394, 409 (1928). 
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Conversely, there is no constitutional rule that each and every 
subordinate body set up by the constitutional institutions must 
itself have the same internal structure as the Constitution of 
1789, in some oddly fractal way. 
Third, bracketing our earlier points, there is a severe mis-
match between the sweeping constitutional critique, on the one 
hand, and on the other the exceedingly narrow context of Auer, 
where agencies are merely sorting out ambiguities in their own 
rules. If the combination of lawmaking and law-interpreting 
functions in agencies really is constitutionally suspect as such, 
then there are much larger problems than Auer to discuss. The 
combination of functions in agencies is a hallmark of the admin-
istrative state, so the FCC, FTC, SEC, and a myriad of other 
agencies would seem to be constitutionally suspect as well; all of 
these agencies write binding rules, bring enforcement actions, 
and adjudicate violations, in the course of which they interpret 
the very rules that they themselves have made. 
Justice Thomas seems to think that these agencies have to 
go. But it is clear that Scalia, the “faint-hearted originalist,”58 
would never have gone so far. And the Court as a body has re-
peatedly said that the combination of functions is not in itself a 
constitutional problem.59 In the Auer setting the quite modest 
combination (for example, in defining the term “diagnosis”), if 
that is what it is, seems especially trivial, de minimis. 
If correct, therefore, the constitutional critique actually 
amounts to an indictment not merely of Auer, which seems at 
most a minor detail, but of much of the contemporary adminis-
trative state. Its proponents should have the candor to argue for 
it on those terms. Perhaps those proponents, or some of them, 
believe that the constitutionality of agencies that combine law-
making with law interpretation is too entrenched to deserve re-
thinking, while Auer is fair game. But is it really a good or even 
intelligible use of the separation-of-powers principle to insist 
that judges must, entirely on their own, interpret the meaning of 
words like “diagnosis” or “diaries”? Does constitutional liberty 
depend on an affirmative answer? 
Fourth and finally, it is a simple confusion to suggest an 
agency could ever “delegate power to itself.” Agencies just have 
whatever quantum of power they have, under relevant statutory 
 
 58 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 864 (1989). 
 59 See, for example, Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 54 (1975); Marcello v Bonds, 349 
US 302, 311 (1955); Federal Trade Commission v Cement Institute, 333 US 683, 702 (1948). 
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grants of authority; whether they exercise that power through 
legislative rulemaking, adjudication, guidances, interpretations, 
or whatever, the quantum of power itself is unaffected. Judges 
can always enforce the outer boundaries of the agency’s grant of 
authority, however it is exercised, whether through statutory in-
terpretation or through arbitrariness review. 
What is really at stake in the Auer setting is not agency self-
delegation of power, and certainly not the expansion of power, 
but rather timing—the timing of the exercise of whatever statu-
tory power the agency otherwise has.60 When an agency makes 
valid legislative rules, those rules bind the agency itself as well 
as all the world. The more specific the rule, the less future dis-
cretion the agency has when interpreting the rule; the less spe-
cific the rule, the more future discretion the agency enjoys to 
flesh out the rule by means of guidances, interpretations, and 
adjudicative orders. Again, the overall quantum of statutory 
power is not expanded but instead allocated between present 
and future. 
Put differently—and this is the way administrative law puts 
it—the agency’s choice is to allocate its authority between more 
general rulemaking now and more specific interpretation or ad-
judication later.61 The more content the agency supplies through 
legislative rulemaking now, the less content it will have to sup-
ply (or indeed be able to supply) through issue-specific interpre-
tation or case-specific adjudication later. 
It then becomes clear that the Auer issue that Scalia at-
tempts to describe as an issue of self-delegation is really just a 
version of the familiar administrative law question of agency 
discretion to choose between policy-making forms or policy in-
struments.62 And the law’s answer—at least since Securities & 
Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp63 (“Chenery II”) in 1947, 
and continuing throughout the modern era—has been that 
agency discretion to make procedural choices is extremely broad 
 
 60 For valuable discussion, see Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 
Georgetown L J *4–7 (forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7FN2-GCEH. 
 61 For a discussion of the close connection between Auer and agency choice between 
rulemaking and adjudication, see Testimony of Ronald M. Levin, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 
16–18 (cited in note 37). 
 62 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U Chi L Rev 
1383, 1384–85 (2004). 
 63 332 US 194, 201–03 (1947). 
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and subject only to the constraints of arbitrariness.64 In the 
standard Auer case, there is nothing at all arbitrary about the 
agency’s decision to specify, through interpretation, what a legis-
lative rule means, not least because the agency is often answer-
ing a question that it did not anticipate. 
C. The Thomas Critique 
Thomas has recently offered a somewhat different objection 
to Auer, also constitutionally grounded—and as we will see, its 
implications are even more sweeping. In his view, Auer “subjects 
regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers 
sought to prevent,” and so it is “constitutionally suspect.”65 It is, 
after all, the power of courts to issue authoritative interpreta-
tions in judicial proceedings. The critical problem with Auer is 
that it substitutes the agency’s power of interpretation for that 
of the courts: “Because the agency is thus not properly constituted 
to exercise the judicial power under the Constitution, the trans-
fer of interpretive judgment raises serious separation-of-powers 
concerns.”66 Congress may not delegate “binding” interpretive 
power to agencies construing their own regulations, because as a 
constitutional matter Congress does not possess the “judicial 
power” in the first place, and therefore cannot give it away. 
Thomas’s theory at least has the virtue of novelty. But the 
problems that afflict it are so many, and so transparent, that 
one stares puzzled at Thomas’s opinion—can it really mean 
what it seems to be saying? Agency interpretations are only as 
“binding” as the underlying legislative rules or statutes them-
selves; their force is entirely derivative. Thomas thus fails to ex-
plain why agencies’ interpretation of their own regulations 
should be thought to count as “binding” at all. 
As the Court emphasized in Perez v Mortgage Bankers  
Association,67 courts retain the ultimate authority to decide 
whether the agency’s interpretation is correct;68 in that sense the 
agency binds no one. And if the agency’s interpretation really 
has binding legal effect, then it may be vulnerable on procedural 
 
 64 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Bell Aerospace Co, 416 US 
267, 293–95 (1974). 
 65 Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1213, 1215 (2015) (Thomas 
concurring in the judgment). 
 66 Id at 1220 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). 
 67 135 S Ct 1199 (2015). 
 68 See id at 1208 n 4. 
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grounds if created without notice and comment.69 Thomas seems 
to be working with some unarticulated, and perhaps indefensi-
ble, conception of the distinction between interpretation and 
lawmaking. Like the academic work on which Thomas draws,70 
his view “largely elides the line-drawing problem posed by any 
attempt to distinguish interpretation from legislation.”71 
In any event Thomas’s theory sweeps far beyond agencies’ 
interpretation of their own regulations, to include any “binding” 
agency interpretation at all, including agency interpretations of 
organic statutes themselves when those interpretations are 
deemed binding. The theory would therefore bar not only Auer 
deference, but also Chevron deference itself, even if explicitly re-
quired by Congress—here too an outcome that is congenial to 
Thomas, but almost certainly not to Scalia. 
Let us end with the Court’s recent, simple, emphatic, and 
powerful response to criticisms of Auer: when the underlying 
regulation is clear, the agency must comply, and it is ultimately 
up to the judges to decide when the regulation is clear.72 It is in-
structive in this regard to compare the critiques of Auer with 
parallel arguments in City of Arlington, Texas v Federal  
Communications Commission73—written by Scalia in 2013. City 
of Arlington upheld the authority of agencies to determine, 
through statutory interpretation, the scope of their own “juris-
diction,” within the bounds of statutory ambiguity74—an abomi-
nation to the traditional legal mind, and a holding that prompted 
vehement objections from the chief justice in dissent.75 
For agencies to do as City of Arlington authorized, the dissent 
argued, would strengthen the “potent brew of executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial power”76 that agencies already mix together. 
(Again, however, let us be clear that the Court has consistently 
 
 69 See id at 1204. 
 70 See generally Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (cited in note 6). 
 71 Gary Lawson, Book Review, The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of 
Administrative Law, 93 Tex L Rev 1521, 1545 (2015). See also Adrian Vermeule, Book 
Review, No, 93 Tex L Rev 1547, 1560–61 (2015). 
 72 See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4 (“Even in cases where an agency’s interpretation 
receives Auer deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given 
regulation means what the agency says.”). 
 73 133 S Ct 1863 (2013). 
 74 See id at 1868. 
 75 Note, however, that the chief justice took a narrower approach, asking exactly 
what Congress had delegated, and did not argue in favor of carving out jurisdictional 
judgments as such. See id at 1877 (Roberts dissenting). 
 76 Id at 1886 (Roberts dissenting). 
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held that agencies implementing statutory grants of authority 
always and only exercise executive power, which includes subsid-
iary powers to make and interpret rules.)77 
Scalia’s reply was strong and straightforward: 
The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by 
establishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency 
decisionmaking that is accorded no deference, but by taking 
seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory 
limits on agencies’ authority. Where Congress has estab-
lished a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where 
Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can 
go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.78 
But this argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to Auer deference 
equally well. The putative separation-of-powers problem with 
the combination of lawmaking and law-interpreting power in the 
same hands—the fox put in charge of the henhouse—is exactly 
the same in both the Auer setting and the setting of agency self-
determination of “jurisdiction.” And the remedy Scalia proposes, 
judicial enforcement of clear texts, is the same as well. 
It is not as though there are no checks on agencies built into 
the Auer framework. Indeed there are several:79 
1. Judicial enforcement of clear regulations and statutes. 
First and foremost, the regulation that is being interpreted, 
if otherwise valid, provides the law, and any interpretation must 
comply with it. The regulation itself must also comply with the 
underlying statute, and its enactment must be procedurally valid. 
Judges, not anyone else, decide whether these requirements are 
satisfied. 
2. Arbitrariness review. 
As the Court also emphasized in Perez, the “most notable” 
constraint on agency decision-making is “the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard,” which serves to promote “procedural fairness” by 
requiring agencies to give good reasons for their procedural 
 
 77 See Grimaud, 220 US at 517–21; City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1873 n 4. 
 78 City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1874. 
 79 For a discussion of possible limitations to Auer deference, partly (but only partly) 
overlapping with the limitations in current law, see Stephenson and Pogoriler, 79 Geo 
Wash L Rev at 1466–1503 (cited in note 38). 
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choices—and, of course, for their interpretations.80 But this is 
not a general objection to Auer deference as such; it is an inquiry 
to be carried out in particular cases. 
3. Reliance, consistency, and arbitrariness. 
An agency interpretation might be arbitrary and capricious 
because it defeats reliance interests without adequate explana-
tion.81 Indeed, interpretations that are inconsistent over time82 
may be disqualified from receiving Auer deference at all.83 Here 
too, however, the notions of reliance and consistency support no 
general objection to Auer. They are qualifications that do not en-
tail or presuppose any doubt about the validity of deference in 
the normal case. 
4. The antiparroting canon. 
Where an agency issues a binding regulation (perhaps 
through notice and comment) that merely “parrots” the language 
of the underlying statute, and then interprets the regulation ra-
ther than the statute, Auer deference does not apply.84 This is 
best understood as a corollary of the completion theory of execu-
tive power;85 an agency engaged in completion should add some 
 
 80 Perez, 135 S Ct at 1209. 
 81 See id. See also Encino Motorcars, LLC v Navarro, 136 S Ct 2117, 2125–26 
(2016); Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 US 502, 
515–16 (2009). 
 82 Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 512 US 504, 515 (1994) (“[A]n agency’s 
interpretation of a . . . regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is entitled to 
considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 83 See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4 (collecting qualifications). The same note also al-
ludes to the possibility that Auer deference might not apply “when there is reason to 
suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment.” Id, quoting Christopher v SmithKline Beecham Corp, 132 S Ct 2156, 2166 
(2012). This last point is a well-established qualification to the Court’s periodic practice 
of affording Auer deference even to agency interpretations contained in briefs and other 
litigation-related documents. See, for example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell  
Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 59 (2011) (stating that the Court “defer[s] to an agency’s inter-
pretation of its regulations, even in a legal brief,” unless there is some “reason to suspect 
that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question”). The issue of deference to agency litigating positions is tangential to 
the questions we address. The examples we have given all involve interpretations issued 
during agency proceedings, not post hoc rationalizations generated during litigation, and 
the major criticisms of Auer, based on the separation-of-powers and agency incentives, 
are not cabined to the latter class of situations. 
 84 See Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 257 (2006). 
 85 See Goldsmith and Manning, 115 Yale L J at 2282 (cited in note 55). 
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specification, some content, to the underlying statute, or its ac-
tion has accomplished nothing and counts for nothing. 
* * * 
So there are a range of qualifications and checks on Auer def-
erence, under current law. The alternative to full judicial review 
of agency interpretations is hardly unchecked administrative 
power; it is a cabined regime of partial and qualified deference. 
D. The Skidmore Alternative? 
Scalia’s own view seems to have been that the alternative to 
Auer deference was no deference at all—de novo judicial inter-
pretation of agency regulations.86 On a different view, there is an 
appealing compromise: independent judicial interpretation of 
agency regulations would be a bad idea (for reasons we have 
sketched), but Auer confers too much discretion on agencies, and 
so the right approach is based on “Skidmore deference.” In theory, 
Skidmore opts for “persuasive” rather than “authoritative” def-
erence. It looks to “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”87—a kind 
of intermediate type or level of deference, which does not 
amount to the abdication that is Auer.88 
The simplest answer to this question is that there is no 
problem to be fixed. Nothing is broken. However, assuming 
there is a problem, Skidmore is not a better solution, for several 
reasons. Scalia’s view, which rejects the Skidmore alternative 
altogether, is theoretically uncompromising, whereas the Skid-
more alternative seems to flinch from the logic of the very argu-
ments the critics adduce to undermine Auer. After all, if agen-
cies interpreting their own regulations are engaged in a kind of 
constitutionally illegitimate self-dealing that results from the fu-
sion of lawmaking and law-interpreting power, why should their 
claims be given any sort of deference at all? The more consistent 
 
 86 See Testimony of Ronald M. Levin, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 16–17 (cited in note 
37). See also Decker, 133 S Ct at 1342–44 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (rejecting Auer and then interpreting a regulation de novo, without reference to 
Skidmore). 
 87 Skidmore, 323 US at 140. 
 88 See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 686–90 (cited in note 4). 
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approach would be to treat such claims as tainted by their ille-
gitimate origin, and to ignore them altogether.  
Furthermore, the line between Auer deference and Skid-
more deference is thin even in principle and often invisible in 
operation; in general, it is of far more interest to administrative 
law teachers than to actual judicial practice. How often would 
courts strike down an agency interpretation under Skidmore but 
uphold it under Auer?89 We suspect not very often. In any case, 
is it really worthwhile to renovate a doctrine that has worked 
reasonably well for decades in order to substitute a standard of 
review that is, at most, marginally less deferential than current 
law? Increases in legal complexity have their place, but this is 
not one of them. 
E. A Pragmatic Perspective 
There is something overheated, wildly disproportionate, 
about the separation-of-powers critique of Auer. Return to the 
cases with which we began. Is constitutional liberty really at 
risk if an agency is allowed to interpret the phrase “subject to” 
or the word “diagnosis,” within the bounds of textual meaning? 
“Bound books”? “Diaries”? Is liberty less at risk if, in the face of 
ambiguity, courts, composed of generalist judges, interpret such 
terms on their own? Does it matter that agency interpretations 
often increase, rather than confine, the freedom of the regulated 
class, by telling its members that they may in fact do what they 
want to do? Does it matter that in hard cases, judicial interpre-
tation of ambiguities often entails political judgments, as re-
flected in the conspicuously and predictably different views of 
Republican and Democratic appointees, even under Chevron?90 
Does it matter that we are typically speaking of interstitial and 
 
 89 In Christopher, the Court concluded that in a case involving legitimate reliance 
interests, Skidmore, and not Auer, would provide the appropriate standard. However, 
the Court deemed the agency interpretation unpersuasive even under Skidmore, which 
reinforces our impression that in most cases the two standards yield the same conclu-
sions; the difference between Auer and Skidmore usually makes no difference. See  
Christopher, 132 S Ct at 2168–70. See also Gonzales, 546 US at 268–69 (rejecting Auer 
deference and then finding an agency interpretation unpersuasive under Skidmore). And 
in any event Perez, which lays out a framework for approaching questions of deference to 
agency interpretations of regulations, makes no mention of Skidmore. See Perez, 135 S 
Ct at 1208 n 4. 
 90 See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 825–26 (cited in note 8); Cass R.  
Sunstein and Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 Duke L J 2193, 
2202 (2009). 
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highly technical judgments, in which agencies understand an 
ambiguous term (“diaries”) in a linguistically permissible way? 
In our view, the strongest objections to Auer are not large-
scale constitutional abstractions. The strongest objections are 
instead pragmatic. They suggest, far more modestly, that when 
an agency is interpreting its own regulations, the best legal fic-
tion is that ambiguities are for courts, not administrators, to re-
solve. On this view, it would be possible to approve of Chevron 
but to disapprove of Auer, contending that if those who write 
laws (regulations) can also interpret them, there is a risk of bias. 
If we distrusted the agency’s competence or expertise, or be-
lieved that it was systematically biased, and if we thought that 
judges could be better trusted to resolve questions that often in-
volve policy judgments, we might deliberately choose to indulge 
the fiction that Congress means to have courts, rather than 
agencies, resolve ambiguities in agency regulations. Some ver-
sion of that essentially pragmatic view may underlie the opposi-
tion to Auer, which nonetheless is expressed in constitutional 
terms. 
But return to the cases with which we began, and ask 
whether a judgment about institutional competence really justi-
fies the conclusion that the relevant ambiguities are always best 
resolved through independent judicial judgment. Law is full of 
situations in which judges review the work of potentially biased 
experts (in part because bias and expertise sometimes come as a 
package); but the risk of bias is just one factor among many, and 
will sometimes or even often be outweighed by the advantages of 
deference. Because of the need to resolve technical issues, and 
because of the plain advantages of accountability, the balance 
cuts hard in the direction of Auer.  
The law’s usual response to such situations is not to substi-
tute judicial judgments for agency judgments wholesale, but to 
examine at retail the reasons that experts give for their policy 
choices—which is why the Perez Court both reaffirmed Auer, 
and yet also emphasized the role of arbitrariness review in mon-
itoring agency choices, in particular cases.91 In any event, as we 
have suggested, the fear that agencies will seek to expand their 
own authority depends on a mistaken factual predicate, indeed a 
naïve picture of what agency interpretations of their own rules are 
for. Indeed, one of the primary functions of such interpretations 
 
 91 See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4, 1209. 
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has been to confine agency authority rather than to expand it, of-
ten in response to questions and concerns from the regulated 
community. 
Auer in effect allows agencies to clarify how they intend to 
exercise their discretion, without fear of judicial second-guessing 
(within the limits of relevant ambiguity). It accommodates the 
many agencies that respond to the questions and concerns of 
regulated parties by saying that the agency does not mean to in-
vade, and has no intention of invading, the private sphere in the 
relevant way. So long as the underlying regulation is ambigu-
ous, and the agency is interpreting it, it would hardly be better 
for courts to second-guess agency judgments on this count. 
CONCLUSION 
For more than seventy years, courts have deferred to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous regulations. In the absence of a 
clear congressional direction, courts have assumed that because 
of their specialized competence, and their greater accountability, 
agencies are in a better position to decide on the meaning of am-
biguous terms. That assumption is correct. 
The contemporary challenges to Auer rest on three weak 
foundations: a question-begging argument about the APA; un-
helpfully abstract and overly sweeping rhetoric about separation 
of powers; and an unrealistic (and somewhat fearful) claim 
about agency opportunism, exemplifying the sign fallacy. The 
best approach to agency regulations is simple: Use the conven-
tional tools of interpretation, and if ambiguity remains, the 
agency’s interpretation prevails.92 
 
 92 Subject to various qualifications. See id. 
